

Did You Forkget It?

Detecting One-Day Vulnerabilities in Open-source
Forks With Global History Analysis

19/02/2026

Work under peer review

Romain
Lefeuvre

University of Rennes
IRISA

Charly
Reux

Inria
IRISA

Stefano
Zachirolli

LTCI, Télécom Paris,
Polytechnic Institute of Paris

Olivier
Barais

University of Rennes
IRISA


Benoit
Combemale

Inria
IRISA

OSS supply chain security

- OSS are at the **heart** of modern and modular software[1]
- **96%** of studied private software contained **OSS dependency** [1] [2]
- A software **attack surface** includes all its OSS dependencies

OSS security is critical



[1] https://www.linuxfoundation.org/hubfs/Research%20Reports/lfr_harvard_censusII_mar2022_042824b.pdf?hsLang=en

[2] <https://www.blackduck.com/resources/analyst-reports/open-source-security-risk-analysis.html#introMenu>

One-day vulnerability

- Definition : Vulnerabilities that are **publicly known, but not fixed yet** in a software you use
- Challenge : identify them quickly and exhaustively, then apply countermeasure

CVE-2024-3094 Detail

Description

Malicious code was discovered in the upstream tarballs of xz, starting with version 5.6.0. Through a series of complex obfuscations, the liblzma build process extracts a prebuilt object file from a disguised test file existing in the source code, which is then used to modify specific functions in the liblzma code. This results in a modified liblzma library that can be used by any software linked against this library, intercepting and modifying the data interaction with this library.

Metrics

[CVSS Version 4.0](#) [CVSS Version 3.x](#) [CVSS Version 2.0](#)

NVD enrichment offers reference publicly available information to associate vector strings. CVSS information contributed by other sources is also displayed.

CVSS 3.x Severity and Vector Strings:



Base Score:  10.0 CRITICAL

Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

CVE-2021-44228 Detail

Description

Apache Log4j2 2.0-beta9 through 2.15.0 (excluding security releases 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1) JNDI features used in configuration, log messages, and parameters do not protect against attacker controlled LDAP and other JNDI related endpoints. An attacker who can control log messages or log message parameters can execute arbitrary code loaded from LDAP servers when message lookup substitution is enabled. From log4j 2.15.0, this behavior has been disabled by default. From version 2.16.0 (along with 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1), this functionality has been completely removed. Note that this vulnerability is specific to log4j-core and does not affect log4net, log4cxx, or other Apache Logging Services projects.

Metrics

[CVSS Version 4.0](#) [CVSS Version 3.x](#) [CVSS Version 2.0](#)

NVD enrichment offers reference publicly available information to associate vector strings. CVSS information contributed by other sources is also displayed.

CVSS 3.x Severity and Vector Strings:



NIST: NVD

Base Score:  10.0 CRITICAL


Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

xz utils backdoor

Log4J vulnerability

One-day vulnerability in open source via declared dependencies

- Well-known and documented challenges
- Many tools available (OSV scanner, OWASP Dependency check, Snyk, Gitlab Dependency scanning, Dependabot ...)
- Based on CVE Databases (OSV, NVD, CVE List, etc.)



One-day vulnerability in open source **via forking**


Definition :

- Creating a new repository by copying the source code and the history of an existing project [1]
- Shared commit fork [2] : Two repositories are considered as forks if they **shared a commit**

Typical scenario :

- 1) Start from existing OSS (e.g. QEMU)
- 2) Create your own (e.g. Panda-re)
- 3) Periodically integrate changes

More than 40% of repository hosted on GitHub are forks [3]



Deduplicated git history in a fork ecosystem


[1] Shurui Zhou, Bogdan Vasilescu, and Christian Kastner. 2020. How has forking changed in the last 20 years? a study of hard forks on GitHub. ICSE '20

[2] Antoine Pietri, Guillaume Rousseau, and Stefano Zucchirolli. 2020. Forking Without Clicking: on How to Identify Software Repository Forks. MSR '20

[3] Analysis based on an export of Software Heritage as of April 3, 2024


One-day vulnerability in open source via forking

- Any commit **can introduce a new vulnerability**.
- Or it can **fix an existing vulnerability**.
- What happens if a project is forked **between introduction and fix** of a vulnerability?
- It inherits the vulnerability, . . . until the change with the fix is integrated.



One-day vulnerability in open source via forking

- Any commit **can introduce a new vulnerability**.
- Or it can **fix an existing vulnerability**.
- What happens if a project is forked **between introduction and fix** of a vulnerability?
- It inherits the vulnerability, . . . until the change with the fix is integrated.



Current approach failed to handle vulnerable commit in forks

One-day vulnerability related to forking is not studied


Detecting One-Day Vulnerabilities in Open-Source Forks

Challenges



1. Forks identification

Forks can be hosted on heterogeneous forge.



2. Large Scale analysis

Research question

RQ1 - Is it feasible to propagate the information about which commits introduce and fix known vulnerabilities to the global commit graph of public code?

RQ2 - Can we use the global vulnerability propagation to identify unpatched forks?

The Open Source Vulnerability (OSV) database as input



- Standardization initiative [1]
- Map vulnerability with affected software version and/or vulnerability event on git history
- Aggregate multiple database


```
"ranges": [ {  
    "type": "GIT",  
    "repo": "https://github.com/owner/repo",  
    "events": [  
        { "introduced": "X" },  
        { "fixed": "Y" }  
    ]  
} ]
```

```
{ "last_affected": "Y" },
```


```
{ "limit": "Y" },
```

Software Heritage, a perfect candidate


Cross forges





Deduplicated model






Experimental Protocol



Data preparation



Labelling



Results




Fig 1. Number of forks having at least one vulnerable commit.






Fig 2. Number of forks having at least one vulnerable commit by forge.




7 162 OSV referenced repos



2.2 M associated forks with at least a vulnerable commit

From more than **302** forges

Results



72 M commits presumed
vulnerable on **referenced**
repos




86 M commits
presumed vulnerable on
forks

Research question



RQ1 - Is it feasible to propagate the information about which commits introduce and fix known vulnerabilities to the global commit graph of public code?

RQ2: Can we leverage the proposed global history analysis approach to detect at scale one-day vulnerabilities in real-world forked OSS?

Experimental protocol





1- Identifying unpatched forks



1.7 M forks with an unpatched head among the 2.2 M



2- Filtering high-impact forks and vulnerabilities



86 forks with 586 (vuln,fork) presumed one-day vulnerabilities

3- Vetting of one-day vulnerable forks

Author evaluation





Detecting equivalent patch that could have been applied by fork maintainer

135 positive and **60** false-positive one-day vulnerability (fork,vulnerability)
69 % of precision

3- Vetting of one-day vulnerable forks

Maintainer evaluation



Maintainer response = the only ground truth

9 positive and **13** false-positive one-day vulnerability (fork,vulnerability)
69 % of precision

Confirmed cases



Panda.re

Fork of QEMU System emulator and virtualizer
CVE-2019-13164



sonyxperiadev/kernel

Fork of linux kernel for xperia dev community
CVE-2021-45485
CVE-2021-4154



go-nv/goenv


Fork of pyenv for go
CVE-2022-35861



bitcoin-sv/bitcoin-sv

Fork of bitcoin
CVE-2021-37492

Integration in software development processes





Prototype : Enabling fork status lookup

Database lookup
didyouforkgetit.dev

Did you forkget it?
Global history analysis to detect one-day vulnerabilities in open source forks

Search over more than **2.2M forks** and **158M commits**

<https://github.com/panda-re/panda> [Repository URL](#)

Search

Filter Results
Showing 2 of 546 results

CVE Identifier: **CVE-2019-13164** Branch Name: **qemu**

Severity Level: **Critical** **High** **Medium** **Low** **None**

Show branches that do not contain refs/heads

Found 1 distinct vulnerability
Across 2 branches

refs/heads/dev 1 vuln

CVE-2019-13164 >
HIGH 7.8

Revision ID: [swh:1:rev:cc@e043e0347918d74c1dfef9e3eb360432ec843](#)
Origin: <https://github.com/panda-re/panda>

Vulnerable head
commit identifier
(SWHID)

CVE-2019-13164
osv-output/CVE-2019-13164.json

Summary
qemu-bridge-helper.c in QEMU 3.1 and 4.0.0 does not ensure that a network interface name (obtained from bridge.conf or a --br=bridge option) is limited to the IFNAMSIZ size, which can lead to an ACL bypass.

Details
qemu-bridge-helper.c in QEMU 3.1 and 4.0.0 does not ensure that a network interface name (obtained from bridge.conf or a --br=bridge option) is limited to the IFNAMSIZ size, which can lead to an ACL bypass.

Severity
CVSS_V3: **7.80** **High**
► Show CVSS Vector


Affected Packages

Version Ranges:
Type: GIT
Repo: <https://github.com/qemu/qemu>
Introduced: 0
Fixed: [03d7712b4bcd47bfe0fe14ba2fffa87e111fa086](#)


Associated fixed
commit

Prototype : Go dependency analysis

Approach




Case study



21 repositories reported as dependent to presumed vulnerable forks

Responsible disclosure

The case of CVE-2025-62518 called “Tarmagedon”



Conclusion

RQ1 - Labelling global commit graph with vulnerability information

- Global history analysis based on SWH
- **2.2 M forks** with presumed vulnerable commit

RQ2 - Detecting one-day vulnerabilities in real-world forked OSS

- Author evaluation : **135** positive one-day with 69 % of precision
- Maintainer evaluation : **9 confirmed positive** over 13 response

Perspective : Integration in software development processes

